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The main goal of this work is to propose a new framework to design a novel family of 
mathematical models to simulate malware spreading in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
An analysis of the proposed models in the scientific literature reveals that the great ma-
jority are global models based on systems of ordinary differential equations such that they 
do not consider the individual characteristics of the sensors and their local interactions. 
This is a major drawback when WSNs are considered. Taking into account the main char-
acteristics of WSNs (elements and topologies of network, life cycle of the nodes, etc.) it is 
shown that individual-based models are more suitable for this purpose than global ones. 
The main features of this new type of malware propagation models for WSNs are stated.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs for short) are wireless networks constituted by several (in some cases thou-
sands) smart devices called sensors capable of computation, communication and sensing. These networks have a 
wide range: from military applications to industrial applications through environmental, healthcare, multimedia 
or daily life applications (Fahmy, 2016).
As WSNs are usually deployed in hostile environments without the human supervision, it is not difficult for 
them to be exposed to malicious actions by a third party (WSNs may not have first protection which is physi-
cal security). Specifically, they may be vulnerable to proximity malware infection since these networks usually 
lack of the adequate security countermeasures. In addition, a wireless connection requires a greater security 
configuration.
The fight against malware can be performed both implementing efficient malware detection and removing 
tools, as well as designing software tools to simulate the behavior of malware propagation in WSNs. This work 
deals with the second strategy. Each simulation software tool is based on the computational implementation of 
a mathematical (theoretical) and in the last few years there have appeared several proposals in the scientific lit-
erature introducing mathematical models for malware propagation in WSNs. Note that this simulation software 
would provide to the network administrators with a solution to learn about the effect of a malware attack on the 
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network. In this sense, data protection is essential and the most important asset for any company, and for which 
many attackers are lurking.
The main goal of this work is to analyze these mathematical models and to provide a general framework to 
design the next generation of models. The major drawbacks of existing models are shown and some techniques 
to overcome them are introduced by means of a new family of models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 a brief description of wireless sensor networks is 
introduced; the man security threats to WSNs are described in section 3; section 4 is devoted to the analysis of 
mathematical models to simulate malware propagation in WSNs; the framework for new proposals about these 
mathematical models is shown in section 5, and finally the conclusions and further work is introduced in section 6.
2. Description of Wireless Sensor Network
A Wireless Sensor Network is a wireless network defined by a group of a large number of smart minitature 
sensor nodes (motes) that are able to sensing, communication and computation (Zhao and Guibas, 2004). This 
technology is a low-cost solution to a great variety of problems in diverse research areas, and its main function 
is to collect all type of data (temperature, sound, vibrations, etc.) through specialized sensors, process and store 
this information, and finally, to forward it to a base station. Usually the low-power protocol ZigBee (based on the 
standard 802.15.4) is used in the WSNs for wireless communications. It uses the PHY and MAC layers.
The first system with all characteristics of sensor networks was the Surveillance Sound System (SOSUS), 
which was designed and deployed – by means of sunken buoys – by the United States to detect and track soviet 
submarines during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the first applications of WSNs were originated around the 80’s 
under the investigations of the Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA, USA), in a project known 
as Distributed Sensor Networks (RDS).
The WSNs based on ZigBee standard are mainly composed of four basic elements (see Figure 1):
1. Sensor nodes: its main function is to collect data directly from the environment and convert it into elec-
trical signals. They are also called Zigbee end devices or reduced function devices (RFD). These nodes are 
usually grouped in clusters.
2. Cluster-head nodes: These nodes are configured to work as middle point between the clusters and the rest 
of the network. They are also known as Zigbee routers or full function devices (FFD).
3. Sink nodes: they allow the interconnection between the wireless sensor network and a data network (TCP/
IP). They are also called Zigbee coordinators.
4. Base Stations: they can be a computer or a server, and its main function is to collect the data.
 
Figure 1. Basic structure of a wireless sensor network
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The usual topologies defined in wireless sensor networks are the following (Selmic, Phoha, and Serwadda, 
2016):
•	 Star topology: this topology has a single central controller or hub, in such a way that other network devic-
es connect directly with the base station, and they cannot communicate between each other (see Figure 
2-(a)). This type of topology offers low-power consumption.
•	 Mesh topology: the nodes can communicate data through each other such that if one node fails, the 
network continues transmitting data (see Figure 2-(b)). Nevertheless, this topology has more power con-
sumption due to redundant data transmission.
•	 Star-Mesh hybrid topology: this topology is a combination of both star and mesh topologies (see Figure 
2-(c)). It takes advantages of low-power consumption and data redundancy of these other two topologies. 
(c) (b) (a) 
Figure 2. Different basic topologies of WSNs: (a) Star topology; (b) Mesh topology; (c) Star-mesh topology
Wireless sensor networks are usually placed in hostile environments without human supervision. As a conse-
quence, it is very difficult to regularly replace the batteries of the sensors. In fact, each node must be designed to 
manage its local power consumption in order to maximize the total network lifetime (Yang, 2014). The functions 
of the sensor microcontroller are the following: acquisition, processing, compression, recording and storage of 
data. To save energy, the microcontrollers usually have some operating modes (sleep, active, idle, etc.) such that 
each mode is defined by a different power consumption level. In this sense, sensor nodes keep in sleep mode 
once their tasks are finalized. Usually sensor nodes remains in this mode as long as possible so long as no sensing 
procedure is required. However in some situations it is necessary to keep the node in standby mode. Both, sleep 
nodes and standby nodes must be able to wake up periodically or on demand. Once the sensor node is activated, 
it is ready to perform its main processes: sensing and reporting.
The diversity of WSNs application imposes a great variety in the design, implementation, and performance 
requirements on the network. The implementation of a wireless sensor network has several design criteria that 
are detailed below (Al-Fuqaha and Benhaddou, 2015):
•	 Regions of Interest: They can be divided into those that are dangerous or isolated versus those that are 
mundane and cumbersome.
•	 Modes of Deployment: There are two distinct mote deployment strategies: random and precise. In ran-
dom deployment, motes are randomly distributed like nodes in wireless ad hoc networks, whereas in 
precise deployment usually consists of manual or pre-planned placement of motes.
•	 Organization and Architecture: the structure in WSNs can be flat or hierarchical. In flat networks all 
motes have the same role and importance, whereas in hierarchical networks the motes are grouped by 
functionality. Usually, hierarchical networks are more efficient.
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•	 Lifetime of the wireless sensor network: This is a fundamental characteristic because the lifetime of the 
network depends of energy and it is limited for battery duration. However, power-saving strategies pro-
vide some solutions.
•	 Ad Hoc Communication: The Zigbee protocol is low-cost, low-power and need a lower bandwidth.
•	 Self-Configuration and Organization: The wireless sensor network will be able to auto-discover neighbor 
motes and organize the infrastructure, independently of topology.
•	 Connectivity and Coverage: It is very important to know how many motes will be installed for establish 
coverage and ensure the connectivity.
In summary, within the main characteristics of the WSNs, we can highlight that they are practically self-con-
figurable, low-power consumption and small-size. For this reason, this type of wireless networks can be used 
in many areas such as agriculture, environmental managing, automotive industry, home automation, military 
applications, patient monitoring in health care. 
3. Threats to WSN security
Today, any device connected to a telecommunication network may be subject to unscrupulous and malicious 
individuals, whose main purpose is to access to sensitive information from the world’s leading companies, in-
dustries, government agencies, etc. To achieve their goals, they use malicious tools including different specimens 
of malware. This malicious code often goes unnoticed for a period long enough to study the behavior of the 
internal network and its elements, in order to extract valuable information. Considering that there is a large 
number of nodes in WSNs and, in many cases, they are usually deployed in hostile unattended environments 
without human supervision, they become a principal target for malicious attacks.
Wireless sensor networks, as well as computer networks, can suffer a great number of attacks, which, for 
the sake of simplicity, can be categorized in Denial of Service (DOS) (Dorca Josa and Serra-Ruiz, 2014), eaves-
dropping (Dos Santos, Hennebert and Lauradoux, 2015), spoofing and replay. Contrary to what happens with 
traditional wireless networks, special security and performance issues have to be carefully considered in wireless 
sensor networks. Furthermore, its security poses different challenges than traditional network security, mainly 
due to the limited hardware resources, and the impossibility of using some security tools whose analytical func-
tions require high hardware consumption.
WSN attacks were tested in (Dorca Josa and Serra-Ruiz, 2014), where it was determined that there are several 
possible attacks to the wireless sensor networks according to the layer of the Zigbee protocol. For example, PHY 
layer attacks can be performed as jamming and data tampering. In MAC layer, attacks can be collision attacks, 
channel noise and frame length (Mohammadi, Atani and Jadidoleslamy, 2011). Network layer attacks are hom-
ming attacks, erroneous or selective routing, black holes, wormholes and Sybil (Raghu Vamsi and Kant, 2016). 
Moreover, flooding and desynchronization attacks are related to the application layer.
Wireless sensor networks are accessible by anyone mainly due to the low cost of the equipment hardware. In 
addition, there are several open source tools for hacking WSNs, and consequently it is becoming more danger-
ous to implement wireless networks with low security devices (Oreku and Pazynyuk, 2016). Initially, the nodes 
of the WSNs had reduced functionalities and capabilities and, as a consequence, they were immune to malware. 
Nevertheless, today the sensor devices are endowed with more complex operating systems and resources and 
in some cases they are similar to smart devices (Akyildiz, Melodia, and Chowdhury, 2007) This new scenario 
allows malware propagation, and specifically the spreading of proximity malware (Zema et al. 2014, Wang et al. 
2013, Wang et al. 2014). For this reason, many techniques and tools have been developed for malware detection 
and elimination, ranging from antivirus, antimalware, antispyware, and others. In recent years, it has been of 
great interest to develop mathematical models for the malware propagation in WSNs (see Queiruga et al. 2016, 
and references therein).
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4. Analysis of Mathematical models for malware propagation in WSN
4.1. Background
Over the last two decades, there have been several models developed to simulate malware propagation in differ-
ent scenarios: computer networks, mobile networks, wireless networks, etc. (see Karyotis et al., 2016; Peng et al., 
2014, and references therein). The great majority are compartmental models, that is, the population of devices is 
divided into different classes according to the malware status and characteristics (susceptible, latent, infectious, 
recovered, quarantined, isolated, etc.) The aim of these models is to study the dynamic of these compartments 
into which the population is divided. 
Susceptible (or healthy) devices are those devices that have not been infected by the malware; latent devices 
are those devices that have been reached by the malware but it can neither to perform its malicious payload 
nor to propagate to another host (the malicious code is not active); infectious devices are those infected devices 
such that the malware is active; recovered devices are those devices where the malware has been detected and 
successfully removed; etc. Consequently, the dynamic of the model is simple (see Figure 3): a susceptible device 
becomes infected (latent or infectious) when the malware reaches it; the device remains in latent status as long as 
the malware will be inactive so that when the latent period finishes the device becomes infectious; if the malware 
is detected and removed the host becomes recovered, otherwise it could be isolated or quarantined. Finally, a 
recovered device becomes susceptible again if the recovery or vaccination processes do not confer permanent 
immunity. Obviously the compartments considered and the dynamic between them depend on the digital envi-
ronment (characteristics of the devices and the network) and the main features (propagation patterns, payload, 
etc.) of the malware. As a consequence, and taking into account all these considerations, there are several classes 
of compartmental models: SI (Susceptible-Infectious), SIS (Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible), SLI (Suscepti-
ble-Latent-Infectious), SIR (Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered), etc.
Figure 3. Flow diagram representing the dynamic of a SLIRS mathematical model  
for malware propagation considering security updates
The nature of these models is very different: one can find deterministic or stochastic models, continuous 
or discrete models, etc. Nevertheless, most of the models proposed can be classified as global models since 
they study the dynamic of the population overall without taking into account the local interactions between 
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individuals and their particular characteristics (Martín del Rey, 2015). In contrast, very few individual-based 
models have been proposed in the scientific literature. This, which is the general tone, also occurs in the case of 
wireless sensor networks (Queiruga et al., 2016).
All mathematical models (with independence of its nature) are characterized by three elements: the variables 
studied, the parameters used and the functional relationships governing the dynamic (and involving the vari-
ables and parameters).
The variables depend on time and they stand for the number of devices found in some of the compartments 
considered (in the particular case of global models), or for the status of the individual device in relation with the 
malware action (when individual-based models are considered). 
The usual parameters used in malware propagation modeling are the following: the rate of infection, the 
rate of recovery (successful remove of the malware from the infected host), the rate of vaccination (installation 
of software updates and security patches), the probabilities of passing from one compartment to another, the 
probability of the acquisition of immunity, the latency and immunity periods, etc. 
Finally, the evolution of the different compartments is governed by the functional relationships that take 
into account the parameters and the variables mentioned above. These relationships can be orchestrated with 
different mathematical tools.
4.2. Global models
As is mentioned above, global models do not take into consideration neither the individual characteristics of 
the devices nor the local interactions between them. Consequently it is supposed that the devices are uniformly 
distributed and connected and all of them have similar characteristics and behaviors. 
In this case the variables of the model depend on time and they stand for the number of devices found in 
some of the compartments considered. In this sense, S(t) means for the number of susceptible devices at time t, 
L(t) stands for the number of latent devices at time t, I(t) represents the number of infectious devices at t, R(t) 
the number of recovered devices, etc. Moreover, the relationships between parameters and variables that rule the 
dynamic of the system are usually given by systems of ordinary differential equations
Differential equations express relationships among the observables (variables) such that their evaluation 
produces the evolution of the observables over the time. They capture the variability over the time. These rela-
tionships can result from the interlocking behaviors of the devices but those behaviors have no explicit repre-
sentation in the model.
Although several global proposals to simulate malware spreading in WSNs have been appeared in the last 
years (Zu and Zhao, 2015), we illustrate the use of global models showing the paradigmatic example of this type 
of models: the Kermack-McKendrick SIR model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927), which is considered the 
keystone of the modern mathematical epidemiology. The system of ordinary differential equations that governs 
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𝐼𝐼" 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)
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where 𝜆𝜆 is called the force of infection and b stands for the recovery rate. The force of infection is usually 
proportional to the number of infectious devices and it can take two forms: density-dependent and fre-
quently-dependent. The density-dependent force of infection is defined as 𝜆𝜆 = 𝑘𝑘 · 𝑞𝑞 · 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) where a = k · q 
is the transmission rate, being k the number of effective contacts (between infectious and susceptible de-
vices) per unit of time, and q the probability that an effective contact leads to a successful transmission of 
the malware. On the other hand, the frequency-dependent force of infection is given by 𝜆𝜆 = 0·1
2
· 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), 
where N is the total number of devices of the network.  
The key parameter governing the evolution of the system is the so-called basic reproductive number 
defined as 𝑅𝑅3 =
4
5
𝑁𝑁. This is probably the most important threshold coefficient in epidemiology. Roughtly 
speaking, the R0 can be defined as the total number of secondary infections caused by a single infectious 
device in an entirely susceptible network. As a consequence, if 𝑅𝑅3 < 1 the infectious node will be able to 
infect fewer than one node before malfunctioning and breaks, so the malware outbreak will die out (see 
Figure 4-(a)); otherwise, the number infectious nodes will increase (see Figure 4-(b)). Furthermore, this 
parameter lso plays an imp tant role in the study of the qualitative behavior of the system of ordinary 
differential equations: if 𝑅𝑅3 < 1 the malware-free steady state (equilibrium point of the system without 
infectious devices) will be locally and globally asymptotically stable, and otherwise the malware endemic 
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param ter also plays an important rol in the st dy of the q alitative behavior of the system of ordinary 
differential equations: if 𝑅𝑅3 < 1 the ma ware-free steady state (equilibrium point of the system without 
infectious devic s) will be locally and glo ally asympt tically stable, and otherwise the malware endemic 
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susceptible network. As a consequence, if R0 < 1 the infectious node will be able to infect fewer than one node 
before malfunctioning and breaks, so the malware outbreak will die out (see Figure 4-(a)); otherwise, the num-
ber infectious nodes will increase (see Figure 4-(b)). Furthermore, this parameter also plays an important role in 
the study of the qualitative behavior of the system of ordinary differential equations: if  R0 < 1 the malware-free 
steady state (equilibrium point of the system without infectious devices) will be locally and globally asymptot-
ically stable, and otherwise the malware endemic steady state (the equilibrium point of the system where the 






















steady state (the equilibrium point of the system where the number of infectious devices remains constant 
over the time) will be locally and globally asymptotically stable. 
 
 
Figure 4. (a) Evolution of the system when R0 = 0.85 (a = 0.0015, b = 0.4404 and N=250); (b) Evolution of the system when R0 = 
1.703 (a = 0.0015, b = 0.4404 and N=500) 
 
4.3. Individual-based models 
The main characteristic of individual-based models is that this type of models simulates the malware 
propagation phenomena by modeling it as an evolving system of autonomous interacting entities. In the 
last decades, this paradigm has been adopted to study the propagation of biological agents (Ferrer et al., 
2010, Smieszek et al., 2011).  
Specifically, this methodology is based on the local interactions between individual agents in discrete 
space and time to produce, taking into account the individual characteristics of these agents, emergent 
outcomes at the individual level. There are four criteria to distinguish the statements of individual-based 
models (Uchmanski and Grimm, 1996): (1) how the complexity of the individual’s life cycle is consid-
ered in the model; (2) if the dynamics of the resources used by the individuals and their local interactions 
are explicitly taken into account in the model; (3) whether the size of the different variables is represented 
by means of real or integer numbers; and finally (4) the extent to which variability among individuals of 
the same age is considered. 
Since individual-based models deal with several entities, spatial scales, individual characteristics, local 
interactions and (sometimes) stochastic events, they are more complex than global models (which are 
analytically tractable). The complexity of individual-based models is reflected not only by the number of 
some quantitative measures (number of variables, parameters and transition rules) but also by the qualita-
tive aspects of some of them (types of individuals, order of interactions between the individuals, etc.) 
Simple individual-based models can exhibit complex behavior patterns and provide valuable information 
about the dynamics of the systems that they simulate.  
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4.3. Individual-based models
The main characteristic of individual-based models is that this type of models simulates the malware propaga-
tion phenomena by modeling it as an evolving system of autonomous interacting entities. In the last decades, 
this paradigm has been adopted to study the propagation of biological agents (Ferrer et al., 2010, Smieszek et 
al., 2011). 
Specifically, this methodology is based on the local interactions between individual agents in discrete space 
and time to produce, taking into account the individual characteristics of these agents, emergent outcomes at 
the individual level. There are four criteria to distinguish the statements of individual-based models (Uchman-
ski and Grimm, 1996): (1) how the complexity of the individual’s life cycle is considered in the model; (2) if the 
dynamics of the re ources used by the individuals and their lo al i teractions are explicitly taken into account in 
the model; (3) whether th  size of the different variables is represented by means of real or integer numbers; and 
finally (4) he xtent to which variability among individuals of the same age is considered.
Since individual-based models deal with several entities, spatial scales, individual chara t ristics, local in-
t ractions and (sometimes) stochastic events, they are more complex than global mod ls (which are analytically 
tractable). The complexity f individual-based models is efl cted not only by the number of some quantitative 
measures (numbe  of variables, parameters and transition rules) but also by the qu litative aspects of s me of 
them (types of individuals, order of interactions between the individuals, etc.) Simple individual-based models 
can exhibit complex behavior patterns and provide valuable information about the dynamics of the systems that 
they simulate. 
Individual-based models are usually based on cellular automata or agent-based models (that can be con-
sidered as the generalization of cellular automata). Cellular automata can be defined as finite state machines 
formed by a finite number of identical objects that are arranged uniformly in a finite space. The states of these 
cells change synchronously at every step of time according to the same local transition rule, taking into account 
that the state of the main cell depends of the states of its neighbor cells at the previous time step (Wolfram, 
1992). Some of this requirements can be relaxed or waived: for example if the local transition rule varies from 
one cell to other hybrid cellular automata are obtained, or memory cellular automata are considered when the 
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state of each cell not only depends on the states of the neighbor cells at the prior time step but also at previous 
time steps, etc.
Agent-based modeling appears in the last decades of the twentieth century with the advent of the massive use 
of computers. It is a generalization of the cellular automata paradigm in the sense that the cells (agents) can be 
of different nature and they are not confined to a regular lattice being non-homogeneous in size or type (Rails-
back and Grimm, 2011). Moreover, the states of the agents do not have to change simultaneously at each step of 
time, and the rules governing individual behaviors may differ from one to another of the agents. Specifically the 
agents are autonomous decision-making entities, that is, each agent makes decisions taking into account of a set 
of rules and the particular inputs received. Consequently, the agents may execute various behaviors appropriate 
for the system.
5. Framework for New Proposals in the case of WSNs
5.1. Discussion
The global models based on systems of ordinary differential equations are well-founded and coherent models 
from the mathematical point of view. In fact, the qualitative theory of differential equations allows us to perform 
and analytical study the evolution of the systems simulated by these systems, and offers a detailed study of the 
main characteristics of their dynamic. Nevertheless, the global models exhibit some drawbacks that, owing to 
their importance, merit our attention:
1) They do not take into account the individual characteristics and/or the local interactions of the individu-
als. Epidemic parameters such as the rate of infection, the rate of recovery, etc., are used but they are of a 
general nature. These values are constant for all the individuals of the same type (or, in some cases, they 
follow a probability distribution). Accordingly, the use of individualized parameters for each of the ele-
ments is not considered. However, it should be noticed that in global modes it could be possible to divide 
each compartment into several sub-compartments considering some constant specific characteristics in 
them. This procedure would partly solve the drawback although the mathematical complexity would grow 
exponentially making it impracticable.
2) The global models do not assume that the individuals are distributed homogeneously and that all are 
connected uniformly. When the propagation of malware is analyzed macroscopically the results obtained 
provide a fairly good approximation of what is really happening. However, if we analyze such propagation 
in reduced environments where the topology of connections play a fundamental role (such as wireless 
networks) the results obtained are manifestly poorer since at microscopic scale the dynamic is very sensi-
tive to local interconnections. Some attempts to overcome this drawback using global models have been 
appeared in the literature. They divide the compartments into subclasses following the same connections 
patterns mainly given by the number of neighborhoods (scale-free networks, small-world networks, etc.) 
Nevertheless, these models are not able to capture all topological characteristics and lead to unrealistic 
results at microscopic scale.
3) Finally, due to their nature, global models are not unable to simulate the individual dynamic of each of the 
individuals. 
Thus, in models based on differential equations we can obtain good results about the global behavior but we 
shall lack information about the individual behavior of each of the individuals. These deficiencies can be recti-
fied simply if we use individual-based models. In these, it would be possible to take into account the individual 
characteristics of the devices. Moreover, as it is possible to simulate the contacts by means of a graph in this new 
paradigm, we could consider different network topologies and even vary them with time.
The individualized behavior provided by these models of each of the devices would be of great use when 
performing forensic analyses when challenged by malware outbreaks in networks. It would be possible to trace 
the dynamic of the infection and from this to draw conclusions about how to improve the control strategies.
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5.2. The new family of models
A wireless sensor networks can be modeled as a graph whose vertices stand for the nodes (sensor, router and 
sink nodes), and the edges represent the communication connections between these nodes (following the topol-
ogy considered in the WSN). Moreover, it is not difficult to know all the characteristics of all nodes. In this sense, 
different nodes have different adjacent nodes (the neighborhood of the corresponding vertex) and different 
functionalities (that depends on the type of the node and its mode). As a consequence, and taking into account 
the brief analysis shown in subsection 5.1 we can conclude that the use of individual-based models is the best 
choice to design a mathematical model to simulate malware propagation in wireless sensor networks.
Specifically, and for the sake of simplicity, the proposal introduced in this work deals with cellular automata 
on graph. The traditional cellular automata paradigm considers that all cells are uniformly arranged in a regular 
lattice and, as a consequence, the neighbor of each cell is usually defined by the four nearest cells at the north, 
south, west and east positions (Von Neumann neighborhood) or the eight nearest cells (Moore neighborhood). 
Nevertheless this approach can be modified according to the characteristics of the system or phenomenon to be 
modeled. In fact in this case the cells (that represent the nodes) are arranged following the network topology so 
that a cellular automata on graph is considered, and the neighborhood varies from one cell to another.
As was mentioned above, the cells of the cellular automata stand for the nodes of the WSN and they will be 
endowed with a state at every step of time taking into account the behavior of the malware. These states can be: 
susceptible, infectious, recovered or damaged.
The local transition rules that govern the transition dynamics between the states of the cells/nodes depend 
both on the functionalities of the node (the type of node) and on the mode of the node. We can consider that 
router nodes and sink nodes are active at every step of time whereas sensor nodes are active during some periods 
of time. Malware spreading between an infectious node and a susceptible node only occurs when both nodes are 
active. The effective transmission depends on the transmission coefficient that must consider the node vulner-
abilities to malware attacks. The transition from infectious to recovered only occurs when the node is in active 
mode and it depends on the network infrastructure or the human intervention to deliver the software patches 
and securing the remote access. Obviously, this process is defined in numerical terms by means of the recovery 
coefficient that comprises the adequate security countermeasures. Finally, the transition from infectious to dam-
aged occurs when the node becomes unusable either by the direct action of malware or by the consumption of 
energy resources.
Obviously the life cycle of sensor nodes must be taken into account when the dynamic of the network will 
be established (see Figure 5), that is, the transition periods between the modes must be considered in the design 
of the local transition functions. In this sense it is possible to adopt two approaches: the use of memory cellular 
automata or the use of simple cellular automata endowed with a new state variable which represents the mode 
of the sensor node.
Figure 5. Life-cycle of a sensor node
Finally, as the topology is based on a finite graph, it is not necessary to establish boundary conditions. 
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6. Conclusions and further work
In this work an analysis of mathematical models for malware spreading in wireless sensor networks has been 
performed. It is shown that the great majority are based on systems of ordinary differential equations and, conse-
quently, they do not take into consideration individual characteristics or local interactions between the elements 
of the network.
It is shown that these drawbacks can be overcome if individual-based models are considered. It is not nec-
essary to resort to the use of agent-based models since simplest models based on cellular automata play an im-
portant and efficient role in simulation.
In this manuscript some suggestions related to the design of cellular automata models have been introduced. 
They refer to the topology of the cellular space, the state set and the local transition rules. It is shown that the 
modes and transition periods between them play a basic role.
Future work aimed at analyzing the definition of the parameters involved in the individual-based models: 
transmission coefficients, recovery coefficient, and damaged coefficient. Usually all these parameters are inherit-
ed from Mathematical Epidemiology (the study of mathematical models for biological agents propagation) and 
the majority are not suitable for use in malware propagation models. Moreover, a software tool implementing the 
theoretical model and considering different environments for WSNs must be also designed.
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